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pAbstract
Shifting political alliances and new environmental challenges are prompting debate
over processes of sub-regionalisation and whether the interplay between multiple
scales of governance leads to positive synergistic outcomes or negative institutional
disruption. Regional management of tuna fisheries in the Western and Central Pacific
Ocean is an example where a web of treaties, conventions and institutional frameworks
underlie international cooperation. Through examining the interplay between the
regional Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission and sub-regional Parties
to the Nauru Agreement, this paper explores the extent to which the PNA and
WCPFC interact in the management of regional tuna fisheries. The results
demonstrate that for contested marine resources such as fisheries, international
sub-regions can go beyond functional units to also present wider opportunities to
shift power relations in favour of small island states. Additionally, the presence of
sub-regional groups like the PNA has served to challenge the performance of the
WCPFC, stimulating greater debate and progress within the regional body. The
paper concludes that the combined work of the PNA and the WCPFC puts them
ahead on many issues and may represent a testing ground for a functional
multilateralism utilising both regional and sub-regional governance platforms for
the management of shared resources.
Keywords: Regionalism; Governance; Tuna; West and Central Pacific; Parties to the
Nauru Agreement; Multilateralism; TransboundaryIntroduction
The perceived crisis in the effectiveness of multilateral institutions has led to a new
round of debate over the form and function of environmental international regimes,
especially around complex environmental problems (Young 2011; Biermann et al.
2012; Conca 2012). While some scholars have gone so far as to suggest a complete
disbandment of international regimes, others have focused on processes of sub-
regionalisation in response to shifting political alliances and new environmental chal-
lenges (Balsiger and VanDeveer 2010; Balsiger and VanDeveer 2012). Questions are
being raised as to what the most appropriate region or ‘scale’ of governance is, defined
not only by the functional spatial extent of a resource or an ecosystem, but also by the
social relations which produce and reproduce cooperation and ultimately governance
(Paasi 2004). The process of sub-regionalisation is demanding new questions of how2014 Miller et al.; licensee Springer. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
rovided the original work is properly credited.
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outcomes or negative institutional disruption (Young 2006; Oberthür and Stokke
2011; Van Leeuwen and Kern 2013). It also questions the extent to which conformity
or conflict of interests can be resolved and lead to governance innovation (Young
2006).
Regional management of tuna fisheries in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean
(WCPO) is made up of a web of treaties, conventions and institutional frameworks that
underlie regional cooperation (see Tsamenyi 1999; Tutangata and Power 2002; Wright
et al. 2006). The main regional fisheries management organisation (RFMO) is the West-
ern and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), formed under the United Na-
tions Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Additionally, two treaty-defined
sub-regional bodies that pre-date the WCPFC, the Parties to the Nauru Agreement
(PNA) and Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), are also involved in tuna fisher-
ies management (see Figure 1). However, unlike regional architectures in other environ-
mental governance regimes, such as the climate governance regime (e.g. Biermann et al.
2009), these two sub-regional bodies supported the formation of the regional WCPFC.
The complex set of governance and institutional arrangements that manage tuna fisheries
in the WCPO have been referred to as some of the most sophisticated sets of cooperative
tools in the world (Hanich et al. 2010), providing a variety of normative structures from
which a range of international and domestic conservation and development policies
emerge.Law of the Sea Convention,1979
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Figure 1 Institutional map of the regional and sub-regional governance regimes in the West and
Central Pacific Ocean (Adapted from Parris 2010a).
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with various qualifications, as one of the most successful in terms of regulating oceanic
tuna and billfish species (Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly 2010; Aranda et al. 2012). However,
its critics maintain that many of the conservation and management measures (CMMs)
the RFMO has generated are insufficient, and that the institutional practices of the
WCPFC lack transparency (Parris 2010a; Gilman and Kingma 2013). Amidst such
debate over the effectiveness of the WCPFC, the PNA (made up of Federated States of
Micronesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solomon
Islands and Tuvalu), has received conspicuous support from academics and NGOs alike
for their recent successes in agreeing on and implementing CMMs, new access ar-
rangements around a vessel day scheme (VDS), and the successful Marine Stewardship
Council (MSC) certification of free-school purse seine skipjack tuna fisheries in 2012.
However, some WCPFC members, like the EU, have criticised the emergence of the
PNA as a competing sub-regional fisheries management body that limits wider regional
coherence.
Most analyses of governance strategies for tuna fisheries in the region have focused
on the trade-offs and complementarities between multilateral cooperation vs. domestic
strategies in terms of management and economic development (Parris and Grafton
2006; Barclay and Cartwright 2007; Parris 2010a,b). Other questions have focused on
models of Pacific regionalism that enable cooperation and capacity for effective engage-
ment in the “global ocean community” (Tutangata and Power 2002, p. 883). Less atten-
tion has been given to a better understanding of the roles of the PNA and WCPFC,
how they interact and what influence each has over the governance of tuna in the
region. If the goal is to create management systems that are sensitive to the spatio-
temporal complexity of fishery resources (Wilson 2006), then can the interplay between
regional and sub-regional management platforms lead to innovative management
outcomes? What is the relationship between regional and sub-regional bodies? Do sub-
regional groupings like the PNA present a means of stimulating innovation and change
towards greater effectiveness at the RFMO level, do they make them less effective, or is
there combination of both?
We explore how the PNA, as a sub-regional body, has been able to be more
experimental in developing tuna fisheries conservation and management measures,
how durable the outcomes of this experimentation are in terms of providing long-term
change, and ultimately the extent to which the PNA and WCPFC interact in the man-
agement of regional transboundary tuna fisheries. The interplay between these different
scales of environmental governance in Western and Central Pacific tuna fisheries offers
a relevant and timely lens to understand how these two scales of governance interact
and what influence they have over each other in terms of creating innovative and
effective management outcomes. More specifically, we ask what implications a shift
toward sub-regional governance holds for the distribution of decision-making power
between the PNA and WCPFC over ongoing contested management issues.
The research is based on attendance at the 9th WCPFC Meeting 2012, where one of
the authors participated as a volunteer with the Secretariat, the contribution of all three
authors in a European Parliamentary hearing in part focusing on the effectiveness of
PNA conservation and management measures, and an in depth a review of WCPFC
documentation. In addition we interviewed four WCPO regional experts to follow up
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tions asked around regional environmental governance. We then turn to a discussion
of the emergence of sub-regional governance in the context of transboundary tuna fish-
eries before going into a detailed description of the multi-level architecture of fisheries
governance in the WCPO. Our analysis then focuses on the tensions that exist between
the WCPFC and PNA in setting fishing reference points, administering CMMs and bal-
ancing the interests of their respective members. Finally, we return to the implications
of sub-regionalism in the WCPO and what implication it holds for governance regimes
such as RFMOs aimed at innovative governance for the long-term sustainability of
transboundary and high seas tuna fisheries.
Fisheries regionalism
Emergence of regionalism in fisheries governance
In resource governance terms, regionalisation is often referred to as a politico-
administrative process of establishing spatially defined scales of management that de-
volve decision-making and create more responsive and adaptive management decisions
(Symes 2005; Balsiger and VanDeveer 2012). Although there is often an aspiration to
base the definition of a region on the geography of a resource, it can also be based on a
process of regionalisation; referring to the socio-political exercise of creating new
political territories (Symes 2012). This can entail either moving ‘down and out’
through the decentralisation of administrative functions and the devolution of deci-
sion making (e.g. co-management), or moving ‘up and in’ through centralisation and
concentration to an aggregate scale (e.g. the EU or RFMO) (Oberthür and Stokke
2011). Examining fisheries regionalism therefore opens up questions about the political
and economic rationale for creating functional and geographic scales of management on
the basis, for example, of resource use sustainability. In the case of fisheries, the strength
of regionalisation and regionalism varies according to how the geography of fishery
resources and relevant political scales are brought together.
The realisation of regional cooperation over marine resources began with the lead up
to the formulation and ratification of UNCLOS, under which ‘global’ transboundary
fisheries, defined by their ecological extent spanning exclusive economic zones (EEZs)
and the high seas, were divided into functionally defined RFMOs (Valencia 1978; Morgan
1989). Since then functional approaches to marine regionalisation and governance have
based themselves on a mix of treaty-based agreements, such as the EU Common Fisheries
Policy (CFP) and the Palau Agreement in the Pacific (Tsamenyi 1999; Symes 2005), and al-
ternative ecosystem-based regional configurations, such as large marine ecosystems
(LMEs). LMEs, for instance, are an attempt to combine geographical scales of the marine
environment with functional administrative scales of management (Vallega 2001; Fanning
et al. 2007).
The 2012 reforms to the EU-CFP raised a heated round of debate about the role of
regionalisation within European seas. Paralleling discussions of multi-level governance,
regionalisation in the EU is seen as a process of ‘moving down’, thereby enabling lower
level authorities to take control of tailor-made management for particular spatial areas,
and ‘moving out’, referring to the increased involvement of private actors in fisheries
management (Raakjaer and Hegland 2012). The exact institutional design of regional
fisheries management in the EU is still under debate, with proposals ranging from sub-
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et al. 2012). Ultimately this represents a wider double-movement; the creation of com-
mon pool management by centralising management at the EU level through the CFP
and a political process that decentralises control to formal (geographical) and func-
tional (administrative) sub-regions (Symes 2012).
In the Western and Central Pacific, the potential for political sub-regionalisation has
been proposed by Hanich et al. (2010). Under their model the administrative burden
imposed on Pacific Island countries by the various supra-national treaties, such as the
PNA and WCPFC, would be mitigated through joint management by sub-regional
groupings of three or four Pacific Island countries. This is nowhere more relevant than
in the WCPO where 40 (WCPFC) member and non-member states make up a mix of
states with sovereign interests over the resources in their EEZs and states with distant
water licences to fish in these EEZs. There are also joint interests of all states over the
four WCPO high seas pockets, international waters enclosed by EEZs (see Figure 2)
(Tsamenyi 1999; Hanich 2009). These interactions have led to a complex multi-level
interaction, with scientific input from the FFA and Secretariat of the Pacific Community
(SPC), of treaties and measures such as the Harmonised Minimum Terms and Conditions
of Access for Foreign Fishing Vessels, the VDS, the FFA Vessel Monitoring Scheme
and the Niue Treaty to manage transboundary stocks (see Hanich et al. 2010 for
detail). Hanich and colleagues argue that a collective sub-regional strategy would
require states to “pursue their own national interests within their vision of a collective
strategy” (p. 89) under a sub-regional collective management authority that would act
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Figure 2 WCPFC Area and corresponding EEZs. The areas numbered 1 to 4 correspond to the high seas
pockets. Pockets 1 and 2 are closed to purse seine fishing since 2010 under the WCPFC. Pockets 1 to 4 are
closed to any purse seine vessels licensed to fish within the EEZs which are part of the PNA”.
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regionalism in the marine environment, which as noted by Symes (2005) is made all
the more complex by how the “shifting distribution of fish populations and the dynamic
nature of ecosystems … [make] natural boundaries … both permeable and unstable”
(p. 87). As he goes on to argue, under such changing conditions, “regions are bound to
be socially constructed rather than naturally occurring and their boundaries inevitably
reflect a compromise between overlapping sets of distributions and ecosystems.” (p. 87).
This very contestation opens up questions on the performance and interplay between
different regional scales of management.
Evaluating regionalisation
The proposals of both the EU and the governing bodies in the WCPO provide a set of
(explicit and implicit) normative goals for sub-regionalisation: subsidiarity provides
more adaptive management; decentralisation and participation leads to more effective
decisions; improved implementation can meet sustainability and development goals of
nation states. But while sub-regionalisation has the potential to create geographically,
ecologically and administratively effective platforms, there is nothing to say that smaller
regional groupings would always improve control of fishery resources or create adequate
incentives for meaningful cooperation that would lead to more sustainable outcomes. We
have identified four interrelated factors that can be used to evaluate the specific outcomes
of the process of sub-regionalisation and the interplay between regional levels: scale, the
creation of normative structures, conformity vs. divergence of interests, and incentives for
cooperation (see Table 1).
Scale refers broadly to the spatially and temporally bounded extents at which a natural
or social phenomenon is observable (Cash and Moser 2000). In resource management
terms scale also refers to the spatial and temporal extent at which institutions are set and
socially or politically organised (e.g. local, national, global) – as such they are social con-
structs open to politicisation (e.g. Meadowcroft 2002; Swyngedouw 2004). For example,
scale helps to identify ideological motivation for the definition of a ‘region’: a social and
political construct created to include and exclude actors from a resource or decisionTable 1 Factors for analysing sub-regionalisation in the WCPO
Factors Potential outcomes
1. Scale • Ideological motivation for ‘region’ formation (regionalism)
• Mobilisation of biophysical, political-administrative, socio-economic or
cultural-symbolic dimensions to include/exclude actors
• Upward or downward transfer of governing innovation between levels
2. Creation of normative structures • Equity, justice and (perceived) legitimacy
• Criterion of inclusive, cooperative arrangements that reduce
complexity of multiple interests
• Interplay of normative structures between jurisdictional levels
3. Conformity vs. divergence of
interests
• Diversity of functional areas
• Degree of institutional-ecological concordance
• Power relations and discourse
4. Distribution of the costs and
benefits of conservation
• Incentives for cooperation
• Degree of cooperation around conservation
• Creation of mechanisms for (re)distribution of benefits
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economic, or cultural-symbolic dimensions (Balsiger and VanDeveer 2010). Scale there-
fore presents an institutional design challenge – ensuring that management institutions
and the organisations tasked with their oversight are set at levels that are concordant with
the social, political and ecological extents they govern (Cash et al. 2006). Following Young
(2006), one key strategy for ensuring concordance, especially when there are multiple
scales of governance, is institutional interplay; where governing functions are distributed
among regimes located at higher and lower levels on the jurisdictional scale (see also Cash
et al. 2006). This institutional interplay also covers the potential of upward or downward
transfer of governing innovations between levels.
Underscoring the creation of normative structures that govern control over trans-
boundary fishery resources by states and fishers alike are tensions between resource ac-
cess, sovereignty and economic development. Although functionally specific regional
bodies may have a higher degree of legitimacy than non-specific bodies, participation
and control remain centrally political issues – especially when dealing with perceptions
of equity and justice (Lebel et al. 2005). The challenge for these regional bodies is
therefore to maintain a degree of inclusiveness and cooperation while effectively redu-
cing the complexity of addressing multiple interests.
The complexity of regional-level governance requires a balance of multiple state
and non-state parties’ interests. In models of sub-regionalism that move down in
scale and out to include a wider range of actors, subsidiarity and democratisation of
decision-making are core principles (Raakjaer and Hegland 2012). But in many other
contexts sub(-national) regions may not be feasible or politically desirable, and in-
creased participation may exacerbate existing (political) complexity in rule making
and implementation. Instead, sub-regionalism may also involve a shift of power to a
smaller group of actors that reduce participation of other parties in order to capture
control over fishery resources. Returning to Young (2006), it is again the interplay
between scales of governance, represented by functional regions, that determines the
extent to which the conformity or divergence in the interests of different actors can
be resolved.
Finally, the distribution of costs and benefits of conservation influence the degree of
and incentives for cooperation within and between particular regions. The common as-
sumption is that fisheries sub-regionalism is underscored by adequate incentives for co-
operation. However, as Bailey et al. (2012) note, the theoretical evidence for cooperative
governance arrangements of fisheries, including tuna fisheries, is in stark contrast to
their successful implementation. The voluminous literature on cooperation around
tuna fisheries in the WCPO focuses on how ‘resource rent rivalry’ has been driven by a
combination of competition for access by distant water fishing nations (DWFNs), the
dependency of many Pacific Island countries on tuna for national income, and aspira-
tions for domestic social and economic development (Campbell 1989; Barclay and
Cartwright 2007; Havice 2010; Parris 2010b; Havice and Reed 2012; Gagern and van
den Bergh In Press). Incentives for cooperation around tuna, like many other marine
fishery regions around the world, are therefore underlined by the need for generating
domestic wealth from shared resources – which under pressure from divisive treaties
and aid relations represents an archetypal prisoner’s dilemma. The degree to which re-
gional management bodies can establish (re)distribution mechanisms of this wealth,
Miller et al. Maritime Studies 2014, 13:17 Page 8 of 20
http://www.maritimestudiesjournal.com/content/13/1/17and the strength of these mechanisms in the face of strong external pressure provides
an indicator for on-going cooperation.
The balance between regional and sub-regional governance in WCPO tuna fisheries
opens up a discussion on the architecture of effective arrangements through the inter-
play between these different scales of governance. The rest of the paper explores this
interplay between the WCPFC and the PNA as two regional fisheries governance ar-
rangements, their effectiveness in responding to complex fishing practices that operate
at different ecological and political scales, and the potential of regionalism to act as a
driver for innovation in regional and sub-regional sustainable fisheries governance.
Regionalism in the WCPO
The WCPFC was established in 2004 after the Convention for the Conservation and
Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the WCPO was ratified by 17 member
states. The WCPFC is based on an international fisheries agreement that aims to foster
the long-term conservation and sustainable use of highly migratory fish stocks in the
WCPO. Reflecting the complexity of multilateral platforms, the Commission holds the
potential to represent the interests of 65 states (as listed in Annex A of the Convention),
but until now has been limited to 25 members, seven participating territories and nine co-
operating non-members and observers. In addition the WCPFC has three technical sub-
sidiary bodies that meet annually, before the full session of the Commission: the Scientific
Committee, the Technical and Compliance Committee, and the Northern Committee.
Unlike all other oceans and tuna RFMOs that predominantly cover fisheries in the high
seas, WCPFC covers both coastal states’ EEZs and the high seas. This places those states
whose EEZs fall in the Convention area in a position of power regarding decision-making
at the WCPFC but adds further to the complexity of this governing body.
Three sub-regional groups, that preceded and were responsible for creating the
WCPFC, are the SPC, the FFA, and the PNA. All three bodies closely coordinate their
activities through joint participation in regional meetings involving their members and
more formal annual consultations between the Secretariats. While the SPC plays a
more neutral role by providing independent scientific stock appraisal information and
advice to Scientific Committee members, the FFA and PNA are multilateral sub-
regional governance bodies that over time have developed different levels of advisory
and regulatory authority.
The FFA was established in 1979 in response to changes resulting from the third Law
of the Sea Conference (see Tsamenyi 1999). The main role of the FFA is as an advisory
and support body to 17 Pacific Island countries – who are also members of the of the
Forum Fisheries Committee (FFC) in the WCPFC – targeting sustainable management
of fish stocks in their states’ EEZs while also maximizing their social and economic
benefits. The FFA does not have any authority to enforce the decisions of its governing
council: all member states maintain sovereign control over fisheries in their EEZs and
archipelagic waters. Instead, the FFA provides support to Pacific Island countries by
facilitating capacity building and regional cooperation through providing technical and
policy advice to its members participating in international forums like the PNA and
WCPFC (Langley et al. 2009).
The PNA came into force in 1982 with the objective of member countries controlling
the terms and conditions of allowing foreign fishing vessels in their EEZs (Nauru
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set arrangements for regular management meetings for tuna stocks and established the
role and responsibilities of the PNA office. Since its establishment, the PNA has
produced a series of measures that have reinforced their control over tuna fisheries
throughout their EEZs. As summarised by Havice (2010), this was first seen in 1994
when the PNA countries reduced foreign purse seine licences by 10 per cent and reallo-
cated them to domestic/locally based vessels. In 1995, they then developed the FSM
(Federated States of Micronesia) Arrangement for Regional Fisheries Access, which
gave vessels from PNA countries discounted fishing licences and reciprocal access to
all PNA waters. After the WCPFC was established, the PNA has continued to create
its own access arrangements and management systems. In 2010, PNA members signed
the Koror declaration underlined by the PNA Implementation Arrangements, which
confirmed support for a range of far reaching fisheries management measures. These
were: the purse seine Vessel Day Scheme (VDS), which allocates days to member
countries who then distribute them to distant water fishing nations (DWFNs) based
on their licencing agreements; high seas pocket closures as part of EEZ licensing
arrangements (see Figure 2); establishment of Minimum Terms and Conditions for
foreign vessels; seasonal closures for the use of fish aggregating devices (FADs) (Palau
Arrangement 1992); catch retention measures; and a regional observer programme for
purse seine vessels (Shanks 2010; Havice 2013). The PNA also created an independent
secretariat to administer control over the Implementation Arrangements, most not-
ably the purse seine VDS, and the MSC certification of the free-school (non-FAD)
skipjack fishery that was obtained in 2011. This strengthening of the PNA’s regulatory
capacity responded in part to the perceived increased power of the DWFNs under the
WCPFC Convention.
The PNA is therefore a functionally important sub-region in the WCPO, with a clear
mandate for management aimed at both domestic economic development and at the
sustainability of their tuna resources. Demonstrating a case of upward transfer of gov-
erning innovations, the PNA is promoting the uptake of innovative management mea-
sures at the WCPFC level with the aim of increasing the functional scale of governance
across all tuna in the Western and Central Pacific. Given the unique experience of
RFMO formation in the WCPO, and the persistence of sub-regional groupings like the
PNA, we now turn to a comparison of these two scales of governance, exploring the
relative success each has had in tuna management and their influence on each other’s
overall performance (Figure 3).Figure 3 Timeline illustrating the developments in WCPO fisheries governance from 1979-2011.
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The interaction of the WCPFC and the PNA on specific points of fisheries governance
is illustrative of the tensions, both creative and constraining, between the two regional
bodies. The following section examines three examples where they have influenced
each other’s performance in terms of establishing reference points; designing and
implementing CMMs and the distribution of the conservation burden; and defining
spatial jurisdiction through changing access arrangements to high seas pockets.
Reference points: the precautionary approach
In fisheries, taking a precautionary approach involves management policies and strat-
egies that account for the risk of overexploitation given uncertainties in assessing the
status of fish stocks and fishing pressures. Guidance on the application of the precau-
tionary management of highly migratory and straddling fish stocks was introduced in
Annex II of the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA) in 1995. Fundamental
to this approach is setting and employing two reference points for fisheries manage-
ment: a limit reference point aimed at constraining catch within safe biological limits;
and a target reference point aimed at meeting management objectives, such as desired
biological, social, and economic outcomes.
The WCPFC provides for the application of the precautionary approach. The Com-
mission is currently developing reference points to inform the development of oper-
ational objectives and performance measures for longer-term management strategies.
At the 9th Regular Meeting of the WCPFC, members agreed upon limit reference
points, according to recommendations from the SPC. Special mention was also given
to the WCPFC prior to the meeting on their application of the precautionary approach
in the WCPFC Performance Review, which stated “The Commission and Scientific
Committee are to be commended on progress made in developing limit reference
points, particularly for bigeye, skipjack and yellowfin” (WCPFC 2012c, p.157). The
WCPFC is ahead of most other tuna RFMOs on this: the Inter-American Tropical
Tuna Commission (IATTC) is currently the only other RFMO that makes explicit refer-
ence to the application of the precautionary approach and the use of reference points
(de Bruyn et al. 2013). Therefore, compared to most other RFMOs the WCPFC is
among the leaders in advancing the development of a formalised precautionary ap-
proach framework.
In spite of the WCPFC’s comparative progress, the PNA are also looking to take the
lead toward setting both limit and target reference points, should the WCPFC fail to
make progress with target reference points. The PNA’s concern about the WCPFC’s po-
tential for implementing these reference points was highlighted during the MSC certifi-
cation of the PNA free-school skipjack tuna fishery in 2011. One of the conditions of
the certification pertained specifically to setting both limit and target reference points
for skipjack stocks in PNA waters within five years of the certification. Initially, there
was pressure from non-PNA actors engaged with the certification procedure for
WCPFC to be responsible for setting these limits. However, one PNA official described
how they fought this because, “if it became a Commission initiative and had to be de-
cided under consensus, all it would take would be for one party to block it and we
would lose the certification”. Instead, the PNA negotiated that either “PNA and/or
WCPFC” could take the initiative on setting the reference points. The official argued
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option for deferring overall responsibility to the Commission, should they fail to reach
an agreement.
The position the PNA takes on this issue is telling for a number of reasons. Firstly, it
provides evidence of the difficulties that have been faced in negotiating regional mea-
sures through the WCPFC, particularly in terms the conflicts that arise from consensus
voting. Secondly, it demonstrates a degree of PNA dependency on the WCPFC, should
they fail to agree amongst themselves on applying limits to their shared fishing re-
sources. Finally, the condition for setting both target and limit reference points came
from the MSC certification procedure and illustrates the extent to which external
market-defined sustainability concepts can steer state-based decision-making.Conservation burden
Under the WCPFC, the primary CMM concerning bigeye and yellowfin tuna was
agreed on in 2008 (CMM-2008-01). Broadly speaking, it covers purse seine effort limits
both within the EEZs of coastal states and in high seas pockets, longline effort limits
and seasonal FAD closures. However, under Article 30 of the Convention, it underlines
“the need to ensure that such measures do not result in transferring, directly or indir-
ectly, a disproportionate burden of conservation action onto developing States Parties,
and territories and possessions” (WCPFC 2000 p.19). This is reiterated in Paragraph 6
of the CMM where, “Unless otherwise stated, nothing in this measure shall prejudice
the legitimate rights and obligations of those small island developing state members
and participating territories in the Convention Area seeking to develop their own
domestic fisheries” (WCPFC 2008 p.3). These clauses attempt to accommodate what
Hanich (2012) has labelled the ‘conservation burden’ associated with small island devel-
oping states’ implementation of CMMs.
Acknowledging the different status of Pacific Island countries, the implementation of
CMMs has been accomplished through the incorporation of a number of exemptions,
including: 1) no limits on bigeye catch by domestic longline fleets; and 2) exclusion of
archipelagic waters from CMMs (Parris 2010a). These exemption clauses could be
problematic from a sustainability perspective because they could mean a substantial
portion of the tuna industry may remain unregulated under the WCPFC and therefore
undermine the effectiveness of the CMMs. Thus far, the so-called exemptions-based
management approach, has not led to measurable improvements in the fishery. In fact,
the PNA have rapidly increased their fishing mortality above their 2004 levels for the
years 2005–2007 (Parris 2010a). Concern has specifically been raised around the access
of foreign (Philippine) vessels to Papua New Guinea’s EEZ, as part of licence agreements
that are aiming to develop processing capacity, and the poor regulation of domestic fishing
activities within their archipelagic waters (Hamilton et al. 2011).
In spite of indications that the PNA fails to act in a way consistent with the sustain-
able management of fish stocks when it comes to the implementation of WCPFC
CMMs, outside the Commission it is providing a platform for developing and imple-
menting innovative management measures for its purse seine fisheries. These include
FAD closures and high seas pocket closures. As evidence of PNA’s leadership in this re-
gard, the Commission has since adopted both these PNA measures.
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ation under Article 30 to reflect their conservation burden, while at the same time de-
veloping innovative CMMs, some of which have been taken up by the WCPFC. At the
9th Regular Meeting of the WCPFC in 2012, continued reference was made to Article
30 when negotiating the terms of the new CMMs. An example of this was during
discussions about expanding the length of seasonal FAD closures for the purse seine
fishery. There was firm resistance from some of the smallest Pacific Island countries on
the basis that this discriminated against the purse seine fisheries, which provide their
primary source of income. They argued that longer closures than those already in place
would be economically devastating, owing to national dependence on revenue from the
sale of purse seine vessel days. Citing Article 30 and the conservation burden, they ex-
plained that they were already experiencing revenue loss from the 800mt of tuna ‘saved’
(not caught) because of the existing closures. And therefore, they would need compen-
sation for additional closures and/or evidence that longliners, that were not included in
the CMM, were also having effort restrictions placed on them.
The economic advantage the PNA states currently hold through revenue from the
purse seine fishery operating in their EEZs provides an incentive to support measures
that distribute much of the conservation burden onto longline fleets (Hanich 2012). As
longline fleets fish primarily on the high seas, PNA states do not stand to benefit
significantly from their activities and therefore want emphasis to also be placed on
managing their effort. This also encourages them to oppose conservation measures that
do not distinguish between high seas and EEZs, or apply new measures over their
EEZs. Therefore, on the one hand the PNA is ‘feeding’ measures they have developed
up to the commission level but on the other hand, under Article 30 there is also the
option to retain control over the implementation of these measures to ensure the con-
servation burden is not transferred back to them. This reinforces the strong negotiating
position of the PNA.
However, there has also been resistance among some WCPFC Members over the
PNA’s role as leader in the sustainable exploitation of its tuna stocks within the
WCPFC. This is most evident when looking at the VDS. Some DWFNs like the EU
have been reticent to fully endorse the scheme, on the basis that the PNA is insuffi-
ciently transparent about how they are allocating vessel days and of evidence that PNA
members were overspending their allocation of days (Havice 2013). In spite of this, the
WCPFC Science Committee has indicated that the VDS has had positive impacts on
data quality by improving log-sheet data and requiring 100 per cent observer coverage.
This has contributed to providing the Committee with better information for their
stock assessments. It also indicates that sub-regional management measures can have
indirect benefits to regional-level governance.
Contested spatial jurisdictions
To date, the legal role of WCPFC is undefined given it has “no legal authority to allo-
cate rights to fish in any manner that undermines the sovereign rights or sovereignty of
coastal states” (Hanich 2009, p. 226). This has created a major tension in connection
with wider issues of allocation of tuna between Pacific Island countries wishing to de-
velop their domestic fishing capacity within their EEZs and the WCPFC, which is also
responsible for management of fish stocks in the high seas (Langley et al. 2009).
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both the high seas and EEZs. They also want to see effort reduction measures in place
that would counter any expansion of domestic fleets. The PNA have indicated they are
amenable to these reductions but as one official stated, “on our terms”.
Tensions between the PNA and the WCPFC over control of the high seas areas are
illustrative of an underlying conflict between de facto and de jure definitions of spatial
jurisdiction. The Convention provides the WCPFC with the remit to manage trans-
boundary stocks across their full extent, including both high seas and EEZs in the
Convention Area. In their 2012 CMM for bigeye, yellowfin and skipjack tuna, the
WCPFC made it clear that “This Measure applies to all areas of high seas and EEZs in
the Convention Area except where otherwise stated in the Measure” (WCPFC 2012b p.5).
The PNA maintains ownership over the resources in their EEZs, but not in the high seas.
However, the PNA is extending control over the practices of distant water fleets, from
states that are members of the WCPFC, in two distinct ways. First, they control these
fleets by setting the adherence to CMMs for fishing in their EEZs. Second, the PNA coun-
tries have closed high seas fishing to DWFN vessels that have licences to fish in their
EEZs. This represents a de facto extension of the PNA’s control beyond their spatial juris-
diction, and a spatio-legal challenge to the de jure control exercised by the WCPFC under
UNCLOS.
Under the 3rd Implementing Arrangement of the Nauru Agreement, the PNA agreed
to close two high seas pockets to purse seining. The WCPFC subsequently adopted the
closures through the CMM 2008-01, which came into force from January 1, 2010.
Explaining “the serious impact on the bigeye stock from fishing by distant water longli-
ners and purse seiners in the high seas and that the high seas continues to provide a
safe haven for IUU fishing” (PNA 2010 p.2), PNA leaders agreed to the closure of two
additional high seas pockets to all purse seine vessels licensed to fish in the EEZs of the
PNA in 2011 (Figure 1). Any licence granted to a DWFN to fish in the EEZs of a PNA
member means the vessel cannot fish in these high seas pockets. On the basis that high
seas pocket closures have shown no demonstrable decrease in fishing effort, and that in
fact effort has been transferred to other areas (SPC-OFP 2012), Japan, the Philippines,
Indonesia and the EU have opposed this CMM. Thus, when at the 7th Regular Session
of the WCPFC in 2010, the PNA sought support from WCPFC to mandate the additional
closures, it was rejected (Ride 2010).
Further, in the 8th regular session of the WCPFC in March 2012, the Philippines ne-
gotiated access for 36 boats to High Seas Pocket 1 (see Figure 2). The position of the
Philippines has been that the closures have put undue stress on their domestic fisheries
and that the decision has led to increased fishing effort in its national waters. In
exchange for the Philippine fishing access, the Philippine government is supposed to
report its domestic and international tuna catch. Philippine vessels must also apply for
international fishing permits before entering High Seas Pocket 1 and must allow 100
per cent regional observer coverage on board their vessels. It is notable, however, that
civil society surveillance has indicated that not all Philippine vessels are complying
with this (Greenpeace 2013).
As the body responsible for introducing the closures, the PNA vehemently opposed
this re-opening, insisting that the high seas pockets should remain closed permanently
or at least until the Commission decides otherwise. However, the permission granted to
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firmed they will only licence DWFN vessels to fish in PNA waters if they voluntarily
forego fishing on the high seas. Therefore, fishing will only take place by Philippine
vessels and maybe a few other vessels that do not need access to PNA waters. Thus, in
spite of the WCPFC ruling, fishing access remains primarily under the control of the
PNA countries. This illustrates the contrast between PNA and WCPFC levels of
decision-making and demonstrates the resilience of measures implemented and con-
trolled at the sub-regional (PNA) level, especially when leverage over fishing access is
involved.
Emerging regionalism in the WCPO
Whether and how innovation is occurring in the WCPO needs to be understood in the
context of the on-going interaction between the WCPFC with the PNA and, although
not our particular focus, the FFA. The WCPFC is different to other RFMOs because of
the existence of these sub-regional groups, which provide an additional, meso-level of
governance. We now turn to a discussion of the main factors that affect the emergence
of (sub-)regional fisheries management in the WCPO and the effect regionalism has on
the innovation of conservation and management measures over transboundary fishery
resources.
Not by scale alone
The powerful position the PNA has secured has meant that, unlike many global govern-
ance regimes, sub-regionalisation enables a process of feeding tested policy strategies up-
wards for regional implementation. The uptake of PNA policies at the WCPFC level
indicates that, instead of representing a crisis point for multilateralism (Conca 2012),
strong sub-regional governance has acted in part as a catalyst for regional policy conver-
gence. It also appears to demonstrate a degree of scalar concordance; indicating that deci-
sions over management measures are being distributed over levels most effective at
dealing with the diverse interests of the actors involved (Cash et al. 2006). Additionally,
through this convergence, the perceived legitimacy of PNA policies is further scrutinised
by the wider global community associated with the WCPFC. The interplay between the
PNA and WCPFC has therefore led to positive creative tension, as well as a greater degree
of transparency and openness than would otherwise have been the case had governance
remained at the more exclusive sub-regional PNA level.
The results also indicate that the PNA’s high degree of functional control over the
fishery has been translated into a political process of fishery regionalisation. Reflecting
findings in other resource sectors (e.g. Balsiger and VanDeveer 2010), regionalisation
has enabled the PNA to exclude some groups from decision making over resource ac-
cess by mobilising biophysical, socio-economic and cultural symbolic dimensions of
sustainable Pacific Island tuna fisheries. This is evident by their success in reinforcing
the functional extent of the fishery with a perceived pro-active concern in the purse
seine fishery (Hanich 2012), strategically using the institutional backing of WCPFC
Article 30, and reinforcing their legitimacy through the MSC certification of the PNA
free-school skipjack fishery. The result has been the convergence of both normative
and functional leverage (Symes 2012) of the PNA as a negotiating body within the
WCPFC. However, it also raises questions about whether these arrangements are
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they are specific to the context of the PNA.
Indeed, the power of cooperation through the PNA’s current position to act as a co-
herent and notably powerful unit when interacting regionally through the WCPFC has
not been lost on other Pacific Island countries. Two additional sub-regional groupings
in the Pacific, the Melanesian Spearhead Group Fisheries Technical Advisory Group
and the Te Vaka Moana arrangement between certain Polynesian states and a group of
countries in Indian Ocean, have shown interest in replicating the PNA model. The
emergence of these new groupings points to the value that can be gained from fishery
sub-regionalisation, bringing together a single functional area and natural phenomena
(Symes 2012). However, such groups within the WCPO are unlikely to achieve the
same kind of leverage with the WCPFC because of the smaller proportion of fish under
their control – the MSC certification accounts for 70 per cent of the tuna stock in its
combined EEZ (PNA 2014). In the Indian Ocean they are less likely due to the more
open geography of national EEZs. As we now go to argue, creating concordance between
functional, jurisdictional and natural scales can facilitate a process of sub-regionalisation
but will not automatically lead to successful political and functional integration into larger
multilateral institutions.
Mutually reinforcing normative structures
Although fundamentally different in aim and legal set-up, the normative structures of
the WCPFC and the PNA have produced a creative interplay for tuna management.
The RFMO structure is legislated through UNCLOS, which mandates the inclusion of
DWFNs. The explicit governance objective at this level is therefore not about further-
ing the interests of member states but fulfilling the broader conservation and resource
management requirements. The RFMO system is therefore designed to create an up
and out ‘double movement’ which manages the interests of historical fishing rights of
port and flag states, rather than a down and out movement designed to stimulate
functional subsidiarity (cf. Hegland et al. 2012). At this level, no project exists to de-
centralise formal and functional control to sub-regions because there is no political
will of the member countries at the WCPFC level.
In contrast the PNA has created an opposite ‘double movement’ akin to that seen in
the last round of the EU CFP reforms (Raakjaer and Hegland 2012); a reduction in the
number of states involved in the decision making and the promotion of conservation
and management measures up to the WCPFC. As such, the PNA is structured as an
exclusive bottom up coalition excluding external actors from governance decisions.
Again reflecting a process of sub-regionalisation, and in contrast to the WCPFC, the
PNA is explicitly working to further the interests of its members in the face of pressure
from DWFNs seeking access to tuna resources. Through this, they are aiming to cap-
ture development benefits, equity and justice for members by promoting sustainable
tuna fishing. This is illustrated by the exclusion of Philippine vessels to the high seas
pockets now controlled by the PNA, despite the Philippines being a WCPFC member
with mandated access.
Moreover, the MSC certification allows the member countries of the PNA to pursue
national interests within a collective strategy of market-driven sustainability (cf. Hanich
et al. 2010). The strategy of the PNA to have their free school skipjack fishery certified
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the recognition of the PNA’s capacity for producing innovative conservation and man-
agement strategies is evidenced by the uptake of these measures at the WCPFC level,
gaining MSC certification also adds further recognition to the powerful position the
PNA holds globally and increases the legitimacy of its governance (See for example
Gulbrandsen 2013). Strategically, the certification also adds market value to the PNA
skipjack tuna, connecting the PNA to powerful external markets like the EU and the
US, further ensuring member countries’ economic stronghold over this part of the tuna
resource. This illustrates that as both a market actor and sub-regional governance body,
the PNA now plays a strong functional role in the WCPO governance architecture.
In spite of the different structures and objectives, both governance bodies focus on
multilateral engagement to produce cooperative arrangements that reduce the com-
plexity of negotiations over and between multiple interests in tuna fisheries. The inter-
play of these normative structures between levels greatly influences both the sub-
regionalisation of fisheries management and the political regionalism of the PNA and
WCPFC. On the one hand, the PNA are feeding innovative management measures
from the bottom up, where shared socioeconomic interests allow the body to ‘speak in
one voice’. On the other hand, scrutiny of these measures within the WCPFC provides
top down oversight and legitimacy. Therefore, while these bodies are fulfilling different
roles one could not replace the other. They reinforce a creative tension through their
interplay that would not be possible should only one level exist and are as such mutually
dependent on each other for management innovation.
Balancing a diversity of interests and the conservation burden
As a region characterised by small island developing states, the process of sub-
regionalisation allows for collective authority and strategic capacity to be generated
among countries whose individual capacity in strategic analysis and strategy develop-
ment is otherwise limited both nationally and when negotiating under a wider regional
regime (Hanich 2010). Our results show that balancing the diversity of interests
through an active process of fisheries regionalism by the PNA is strategic and closely
related to negotiating a more equitable distribution of the conservation burden in inter-
national fora like the WPCFC. We therefore discuss the two evaluative criteria of tension
between converging/diverging interests and benefit distribution together.
In spite of playing an instrumental role in the creation of the WCPFC, its presence as
the highest governing body within the region has seen the Pacific Island countries con-
solidate their position as a sub-regional group, which is less open to outside, country
by country, negotiation over access. As opposed to the partnership-oriented approach
intended by RFMO level governance, the PNA have placed more of a focus on intern-
ally controlled implementation, treating DWFNs increasingly as licensees. The pro-
active role of the PNA in searching for innovative ways to control the WCPO tuna
fishery also provides an indication of underlying regional political tensions. As outlined
by Aqorau (2009), the PNA’s response is a direct challenge to DWFNs that are seen as
“intent on vitiating the gains the PNA have made through the VDS” (Aqorau 2009,
p.599). This can be seen as an on-going exercise in capturing control over tuna fisheries
that was lost in previous attempts to reduce licence numbers under the Palau agree-
ment and increased power of the DWFNs under the WCPFC Convention. In turn this
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just after the WCPFC emerged, thereby strengthening their management and control
over access agreements (Havice 2010). Although criticised for its lack of transparency
in allocating vessel days, and for consistently exceeding the number of days appor-
tioned, the control the PNA nations exercise over fishing effort within limits consistent
with resource sustainability both put in place a stronger identity of the PNA as a manage-
ment region, while also putting the associated countries in a powerful position to secure
control over DWFNs represented at the WCPFC.
The PNA’s success in shaping these broader governance processes is still however, a
relatively new aspect of the overall WCPO governance architecture. While the PNA
itself has been around for a long time, it has only really presented a demonstrable
challenge to the status quo of regional-level governance since 2008. Therefore, the
longevity of this kind of governance interplay is unknown. While strategic interac-
tions between the different levels illustrate the value of sub-regionalisation in WCPO
tuna fisheries governance, it is dependent on the PNA either retaining their position
as a unified group or face what has been referred to in other trans-boundary governance
regimes as fragmentation (e.g. Biermann et al. 2009). For instance, this is being challenged
by Kiribati’s negotiations with the EU over their fisheries partnership agreement. In these
negotiations, the EU has insisted that the three year protocol granting access to 10 EU
fishing vessels (four purse seiners and six longliners), does not incorporate the VDS (EU
Committee on Fisheries 2013). This agreement would see Kiribati essentially defecting
from the conditions set out by the VDS. Additionally, by insisting on remaining outside
the VDS, the EU is maintaining a relatively low access fee that distorts the regional market
for access to the tuna fishery. This case demonstrates both the strength and weakness of
fishery regionalism in the PNA. It also shows the change in strategy required by the
DWFN members of the WCPFC who are marginalised by the powers of exclusion now
exercised by the PNA through their conservation and management measures.
Therefore, given the additional importance of DWFNs’ fishing interests, the WCPFC
provides a critical venue for enforced cooperation amongst its member. This makes
governance at the regional level far from redundant. The complex mosaic of jurisdic-
tions in the region means that the challenges that the FFA, PNA and the WCPFC have
faced so far will be compounded over the coming years as they come under increasing
pressure to respond to over-fishing and over-capacity concerns (Hanich 2010), the rise
of other emerging regional groupings staking their own claims and changes in negoti-
ation strategies by DWFNs.Conclusion
The performance of tuna fisheries governance in the WCPO is increasingly determined
by the interplay between regional and sub-regional bodies responsible for designing
and implementing conservation and management measures. Sub-regionalisation ap-
pears to be a means for overcoming the limitations of large international environmental
regimes. However, distributing management functions over geographical scales is only
likely to be effective if there is a mix of political will and multilateralism that can create
cooperation for sustainable management and reduce competition. In the case of the
WCPO, the sub-regional PNA supported higher levels of governance through the
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ance capacity. The case illustrates that for contested marine resources such as fisheries,
international sub-regions can go beyond functional units to also present wider oppor-
tunities to shift power relations in the favour of small island states.
The PNA has emerged in a strong position to innovate management measures that
would not otherwise be possible at the more inclusive WCPFC level. This strength has
led some to describe the PNA as a “tuna cartel” with the WCPO becoming the “Saudi
Arabia of Tuna” (Brian Jeffries quoted in Aqorau 2009 p.581). The skipjack fishery
most clearly demonstrates this ‘cartel’: it illustrates how functional regionalisation can
lead to a wider regionalism of fisheries management, which in turn can lead to positive
interplay between levels of governance. MSC certification of the PNA free school tuna
fishery provides an added layer of legitimacy to the PNA management measures and in-
directly the PNA as a fishery region. But although the MSC appears to play a role in
supporting fisheries regionalism, it remains unclear as to whether it offers a strong long
term strategy for consolidating cooperation between the member states. Should economic
benefits not accrue to these states, defection rather cooperation may prove to be the
outcome.
This case contributes a more nuanced understanding to the perceived crisis of multilat-
eralism by identifying how new forms of regionalism can contribute to solving complex
environmental problems. Far from complicating the process of governance and decision-
making, the presence of sub-regional groups like the PNA have the potential to construct-
ively challenge higher scale regional groupings like the WCPFC. The combined work of
the PNA and the WCPFC may represent a testing ground for a functional multilateralism
based on shared resources and utilising both regional and sub-regional governance
platforms. However, at least in fisheries, but also in other resource sectors, the question
remains whether and how other regional/sub-regional arrangements can emerge that that
can take into account the complex social and ecological interactions to promote sus-
tainable production, waste or conservation practices.
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